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China’s Entry into the WTO—A Mistake by the United States?
Jennifer Hillman1

Abstract:
The conclusion that China's accession to the WTO was a failure from a U.S. perspective stems
from: 1) loading too many issues and expectations—including an entire panoply of national
security and geostrategic concerns -- on to the WTO and its rules-based, binding dispute
settlement system to address; 2) failure by the United States and the rest of the world to use the
tools available as a result of China’s accession to the WTO to both protect their domestic
markets and hold China to account for its WTO commitments; and 3) China’s U-turn away from
market-economy reforms to a much more state-centric, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-run
economy. Addressing the United States’ concerns with China will require working to strengthen
the WTO and then using it to take on a more limited set of trade concerns while using other tools
to address broader concerns both bilaterally and in conjunction with allies and partners.
**********************************************

“ . . .it seems clear that the United States erred in supporting China’s entry into
the WTO on terms that have proven to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace
of an open, market-oriented trade regime”
2017 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance

I. Introduction
On December 11, 2001, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
culmination of an American-supported process that opened China to global investment and
helped make it the workshop of the world. Since then, the halls of Washington D.C. have been
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wracked by debates over how to understand—and manage—China’s entrance on to the global
stage.
By delineating the drivers of U.S. decision-making in the lead up to China’s accession to the
WTO and cataloguing actions taken in the years immediately following, this chapter hopes to
offer a partial explanation of how and why the United States has grown skeptical of the rulesbased trading system’s ability to address concerns with China, despite serving for decades as its
chief architect and as a key proponent of China’s entry into the WTO. The paper demonstrates
the wide range of issues that many politicians thought could be addressed as part of China’s
accession processes, contrasting those views with the reality of what was both achievable and
included in China’s protocol to join a trade organization with a particular and circumscribed set
of rules. While it would be misguided to attribute the current state of the international trading
system solely to the choices of U.S. policymakers or the actions of China, U.S. decisions,
particularly the decision to prevent new judges from being appointed to the Appellate Body and
the decision to pursue unilateral tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States, have clearly had
a major impact. These choices, once unimaginable, are best understood as part of Washington’s
reaction to China’s rise along with perceived failures by the WTO.
A. Shifting Views of Engagement with Trade and China
The old China consensus was built on a broad understanding of the benefits of engagement, an
optimism about liberalization in China, a desire to avoid Sino-American confrontation as well as
a belief that Chinese-American economic ties would provide material and, in some cases,
domestic political benefits, for key U.S. stakeholders. These interests and beliefs were the basis
of U.S.-China policy and ensured relative stability from administration to administration. It was
under the auspices of this coalition that the pre-requisite for China’s admission to the WTO—
“permanent normal trading relations” between China and the United States—was established.
Now, however, a growing conviction that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses a
fundamental threat to the United States’ hegemonic role, as well as economic losses and growing
income inequality associated with trade with China, has undermined support for the expansive
trade policy the United States once regularly pursued.
Policymakers on both sides of the aisle have also become skeptical of the material benefits
offered by engagement. Rather than opening markets to U.S. firms, a more cynical view that sees
globalization and trade as hollowing out the U.S. manufacturing base and middle class is
increasingly common.2 As China has moved up the global value-chain and become a direct
competitor in sectors previously thought to be U.S. strongholds like advanced computing and
telecommunications, China’s economic might and state-led practices have begun to pose a direct
threat to the United States’ defense industrial base and other influential elements within the U.S.
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political system.3 Both parties have endorsed and continue to explore industrial policies that
would have once been taboo.
At the same time, political benefits of opposing a liberal trade policy have grown. Republican
Party leaders, a traditional stronghold of free trade sentiment have, in recent years, grown more
skeptical both of China and open trade policies more generally. The Democratic Party, long
divided on trade, has been faced with the need to compete for blue-collar voters distributed in
strategically important states and has grown skeptical that trade can deliver the broad-based
growth imagined by members of the Clinton administration who championed China’s accession
to the WTO.4 Those within the Democratic Party who see an open trade agenda as essential to
both economic growth and successful competition with China have become more self-conscious
of the political liabilities associated with trade and have tempered their aspirations accordingly.5
Washington’s evolution has deep implications for the future of the WTO. Born in an era of
American self-confidence, military dominance, and liberalizing ambition, the WTO is perceived
in some quarters to be ill-suited for the current moment. In the face of a growing ChineseAmerican contest, the WTO’s challenge is to avoid being trampled or sidelined while still
working to preserve the multilateral, rules-based trading regime. This can only be accomplished
if the WTO reorients itself to become a venue where competitors are able to come together to
address pressing global problems like climate change, global health, income inequality, digital
commerce, and the implications of significant non-market economy actors as members of the
WTO.
B. Policy of Engagement
From at least the end of the Cold War to the late 2010s, the United States pursued a strategy of
“engagement” towards China.6 Under the auspices of this strategy, the United States attempted to
expand economic and political ties between the two countries. While trade normalization is the

E.S. Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations”, The Washington Quarterly, 41 (2019), 93119.
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most prominent element this strategy, it also included military-to-military dialogues, educational
and scientific contacts, and collaboration in multilateral fora.
As a strategy, engagement was broadly intended as a way of managing the rise of China. The
architects of engagement sought to accomplish a wide variety of goals, ranging from increased
Sino-American collaboration on non-proliferation and environmental issues to accelerated
economic growth in the United States.7 Among these goals were the political and economic
liberalization of China. By approaching China with an open hand, U.S. officials believed they
would be better positioned to accomplish these goals. Engagement was thought to produce
comity and trust between the two powers, empower less confrontational elements within the
regime, and, hopefully, set the groundwork for liberalization.
In recent years, the policy of engagement has been reconsidered.8 This shift has been
substantially the result of China’s growing geopolitical power, increasingly assertive behavior on
the international stage and a turn toward a more state-centric, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
controlled economy. Engagement was explicitly intended to prevent a Sino-American
confrontation. Today, there is a sense that some sort of Chinese-American competition is
inevitable and, perhaps concerningly, may even be desirable. China’s pivot away from market
reform has also undercut one of the primary rationalizations for engagement. Unlike their
predecessors, policymakers in the United States are increasingly skeptical that reformist elements
in China can change China’s economic path or that U.S. actions can empower the reformists.
Finally, domestic dynamics have made open trade writ large increasingly toxic and trade with
China an especially hot-button issue.
As the U.S. policy towards a more assertive China has come under increased scrutiny, attitudes
toward the WTO have shifted. An initial optimism about the power of the WTO to discipline
and mold China has been replaced by a frustration with the WTO’s apparent inability to confront
Chinese abuses. That frustration has itself contributed to a lack of support for the WTO as an
institution, particularly for its dispute settlement system and its Appellate Body.

II. Implications of the Debate Over Granting China “Permanent Normal Trade Relations”
Status
As noted below, the process for China joining the WTO involved both the negotiation of China’s
WTO Protocol of Accession (Protocol) and its accompanying Working Party Report (Report)
and legislation in the United States to grant China “permanent normal trade relations” (PNTR) to
replace the annual review of whether Chinese goods could enter the United States under “Most
Favored Nation” (MFN) rates of duty. PNTR was necessary to meet the prerequisite required of
the United States to “immediately and unconditionally” grant Chinese goods the same tariffs and
A.I. Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”, The Washington Quarterly, 42 (2019),
99-114.
8
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trade treatment as goods from all other WTO members—called MFN everywhere but the United
States, where the term “normal trade relations” is used instead.9
A. Expansive View of the Role of the WTO Accession Process
China’s accession to the WTO was negotiated under the Clinton Administration, taking as their
point of departure President Clinton’s view that China could play a positive role in advancing
environmental standards, fighting transnational crime, bolstering the international trading
system, contributing to an arms control regime, and promoting stability in East Asia.10 While
“political pluralism” and “free markets” in China were stated goals of the Clinton administration,
these long-term objectives were part of a larger agenda that included pressing short-term
concerns like the burgeoning North Korean nuclear program and the desire to diffuse tensions
over Taiwan. PNTR was viewed internally by advocates, as Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky
later recounted, as “the one chance the U.S. and China had to create an enduring foundation for
the relationship.”11 The logic was that “if we treated China as an enemy, we were guaranteeing
an enemy in the future. If we treated China as a friend, we could not guarantee friendship, but we
could at least keep open the possibility of more benign outcomes.”12
For the Clinton team, the benefits of engagement were not theoretical. They had seen how deeper
ties could help diffuse both bilateral and regional stressors. The U.S. Trade Representative at the
time, Mickey Kantor, would later argue that trade ties helped the two countries manage the 1995
Taiwan Strait Crisis, commenting that he was “convinced that the trade relationship was a strong
connecting bond between the U.S. and China at a time when we needed it, particularly in late ’95
and early ’96.”13 According to former Secretary of Defense William Perry, the threat posed by
North Korea, “provided a pretty strong incentive to see if we could go out and re-establish a
reasonable relationship with [China],” which had previously provided useful intelligence about
North Korean ambitions.14
The Clinton administration also saw their ability to encourage and support reformers within the
Chinese regime as essential to accomplishing their varied goals. The contention was the boost to
Chinese economic growth contributed by PNTR would “bolster the confidence of Chinese
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Quoted in: Y.E. Yang, “Leaders’ Conceptual Complexity and Foreign Policy Change: Comparing the Bill Clinton
and George W. Bush Foreign Policies toward China”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3 (2010), 415446.
W.I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, (Columbia University Press,
2019), pp. 245.
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leadership in ways that reduce their fear about political reform.”15 Enabling “reformers” within
China could allow the United States to pursue a wide range of priorities by creating a China that
was “more cooperative on such crucial issues as nonproliferation, regional security,
peacekeeping, human rights, and arms control.”16 Rejecting PNTR, however, would empower
elements within China “who want to tighten the internal clamps, invest more heavily in the
military-industrial complex, and hunker down for the ‘inevitable; struggle with America
bilaterally, regionally, and globally.” The “worst case” scenario was a “US-China confrontation
across Asia.”
The United States’ ability to tip the scales in China’s domestic political debates was a core
assumption of the engagement strategy. President Clinton suggested that refusing to engage with
China “would encourage the Chinese to become hostile,” while National Security Sandy Berger
argued that U.S. aggressive U.S. policies would “fuel the very inward-looking forces that
trample human rights.”17 While the administration was also clear that China would ultimately
choose its own destiny, there was a sense that the right set of U.S. actions could enable the rise of
reformers who would be amicable to the United States and the international system.
B. The PNTR Vote
In the summer of 2000, nearly 18 months before China would formally join the WTO, came the
Congress’ big moment to weigh in on U.S.-China trade policy. In the end, the vote was not
particularly close, especially in the Senate, with the House voting in favor of granting PNTR to
China in May 2000, 237-197; and the Senate following in September 2000, approving by a vote
of 83-15.18 But the vote came only after fierce debate before a skeptical Congress. While
technically the Congress had been acting on China policy through its annual decision to waive
freedom-of-emigration requirements (called Jackson-Vanik provisions) that would have the
effect of taking away China’s Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status, the reality was that while
the House of Representatives voted to deny NTR to China in 1990, 1991 and 1992, there was no
agreement from the Senate, and neither legislative body took any action to change China’s status
after 1992.19 As a result, China had effectively been receiving NTR treatment and access to the
U.S. market on terms comparable to other WTO members since 1980. But the lead-up to the
2000 vote to grant China NTR status on a permanent basis underscored deep divisions and
concerns over the future economic relationship between the United States and China.

See: Memorandum Kenneth Lieberthal, Senior Director for Asia on Clinton’s National Security Council, outlining
the national security rationale for PNTR. S. Berger, Remarks to the East Asia Institute at Columbia University on
China, New York, NY, 2000, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/11241.
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Ibid.
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S. Berger, “Remarks by Samuel R. Berger: Building a New Consensus on China”, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, NY, 1997, https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/9678. W.J. Clinton, “Remarks by the
President in Address on China and the National Interest”, 1997,
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18
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19
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The Clinton Administration put on a full-court press, with most of the cabinet weighing in to
support a vote in favor of shifting U.S. policy from one in which China’s access to the U.S.
market had to be, at least technically, reviewed each year, with the possibility that it’s “most
favored nation/normal trade relations” status could be removed at any time. In urging Congress
to pass PNTR legislation, President Clinton noted that supporting China’s entry to the WTO was
in the United States’ broader national interest because it represented “the most significant
opportunity we have had to create positive change in China since the 1970s.”20 He made clear,
however, that it would also advance U.S. economic interests, describing the U.S. agreement as
“the equivalent of a one-way street. It requires China to open its markets — with a fifth of the
world's population, potentially the biggest markets in the world — to both our products and
services in unprecedented new ways. All we do is to agree to maintain the present access which
China enjoys.”21
President Clinton described the outcome of the affirmative vote in the House as “an historic step
toward continued prosperity in America, reform in China, and peace in the world” and for “an
America that will be more prosperous and more secure; for a China that is more open to our
products and more respectful of the rule of law at home and abroad.”22 At the same time,
Clinton recognized that nothing about the trajectory of China or the U.S.-China relationship was
guaranteed – but represented a chance for the U.S. and China to build a better and different
future in the Asia Pacific community.
The American business community for its part believed that the normalization of trade relations
with China would offer an economic windfall. The business community had long been advocates
of increased trade with China. Their lobbying—supported by the Chinese government—helped
reverse Clinton’s initial China policy, which had linked trade access to progress on human
rights.23 As Warren Christopher, Clinton’s Secretary of State and an advocate for the linkage
policy, later put it, “the business community had convinced the president that trade for America
was a higher value, or perhaps to put it more charitably, that nothing would be accomplished in
the field of human rights by denial of trade, and so that became the basic policy.”24
Advocates argued that PNTR would promote U.S. security and economic interests and have little
downside. Then-Senator Joe Biden, for instance, argued that it would help “help promote
stability across the Taiwan Straits,” encourage China to reform its economic system and
“enhance their respect for the rule of law,” while offering the United States “one-way” trade
20
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concessions.25 Those supporting PNTR for China focused on the economic gains and the chance
to support economic reforms in China, with even Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan
declaring PNTR would “create new opportunities for American businesses and farmers.” Critics,
on the other hand, focused on China’s poor human rights record, its continued threats to Taiwan,
its contribution to nuclear proliferation, its violation of environmental standards for
development, and its labor abuses.
The Clinton administration explicitly pushed PNTR as a way of accelerating Chinese
marketization and democratization, suggesting that it would “strengthen reformers” who were
“trying to move policy in the right direction.”26 The deal was seen as a potential boon to U.S.
exporters, something that excited many Congressional supporters, while USTR Charlene
Barshefsky indicated that the administration had “no reason to expect any substantial increases in
Chinese imports at all.”27
C. The Reality of China’s Accession Commitments
While the arguments in the United States for granting China PNTR status in order to pave the
way for its entry into the WTO may have focused on a broad range of geostrategic, political,
national security, human rights and economic issues, along with the empowerment of the
reformists in China, the negotiations in Geneva were limited to trade issues and to the trading
rules that China was signing up to.
When the accession negotiations were ultimately concluded and China joined the WTO in
December 200128, it did so only after making a substantial number of commitments and changes
to its domestic economic laws, including:
•

•
•

•

Major reductions in Chinese tariffs. Average tariffs on industrial products were reduced
to 9.4% by 2005; elimination of all tariffs on high-technology products; auto tariffs fell
from 80-100% to 25% by 2006; agriculture tariffs fell to an average of 17.5% by 2004.
Elimination of import quotas and licensing requirements by 2005.
Granting of import and distribution rights to foreign corporations, which allowed them to
set up wholly-owned distribution, sales (including retail), shipping, and service networks
over a three-year phase-in period.
Financial services and telecommunications—ending the outright ban on any foreign
ownership but leaving a number of restrictions and limitations on foreign ownership in
place.

“Giving Permanent Normal Trade Relations Status to Communist China: National Security and Diplomatic,
Human Rights, Labor, Trade, and Economic Implications”, Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Hrg. 106-744, 106th
Congress, 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106shrg67840/html/CHRG-106shrg67840.htm.
26
G. Sperling, “PNTR and the Prospects for a More Open China”, Remarks to the Committee for Economic
Development, Washington, DC, 2000,
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/nec/html/PunkeChinaSpeech2.html.
27
“The Administration’s Proposal for Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China”, Committee on Agriculture,
S. Hrg. 106-52, 106th Congress, 2000, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ag/hag10652.000/hag10652_0f.htm.
28
For a thorough analysis of the negotiations and process of China’s accession to the WTO, see: P. Blustein,
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•

•

Other services -- increased market access for professional services, including accounting,
consulting, engineering, medical, and information technology, while maintaining
numerous restrictions and limitations.
Commitment to implement and enforce international standards on the protection of
intellectual property; provision for increased access and distribution rights for a specified
number of motion pictures, music, and software.

The WTO-Director General at the time, Supachai Panitchpadi, described China’s accession
agreement as signaling “China’s willingness to play by international trade rules and to bring its
often opaque and cumbersome government apparatus into harmony with a world order that
demands clarity and fairness.”29
The USTR report to the Congress in 2004 summed up the process and the outcome:
“The United States and other WTO members negotiated with China for 15 years
over the specific terms pursuant to which China would enter the WTO. As a result
of those negotiations, China agreed to extensive, far-reaching and often complex
commitments to change its trade regime, at all levels of government. China
committed to implement a set of sweeping reforms that required it to lower trade
barriers in virtually every sector of the economy, provide national treatment and
improved market access to goods and services imported from the United States
and other WTO members, and protect intellectual property rights (IPR). China
also agreed to special rules regarding subsidies and the operation of state-owned
enterprises, in light of the state’s large role in China’s economy. In accepting
China as a fellow WTO member, the United States also secured a number of
significant concessions from China that protect U.S. interests during China’s
WTO implementation stage. Implementation should be substantially completed –
if China fully adheres to the agreed schedule – by December 11, 2007. By
contrast, the United States did not make any specific new concessions to China,
other than simply to agree to accord China the same treatment it accords the other
146 members of the WTO.”30
None of these commitments, however, directly addressed the broader issues and aspirations for
change within China that were an integral part of the debate over passage of PNTR. For
example, none of them spoke to issues such as nuclear proliferation or human rights that had
been critical points underlying support for PNTR.
III. Special Scrutiny for China
The level of concern in some quarters about granting China PNTR and paving the way for its
entry into the WTO can be seen in two unusual provisions that were included in the PNTR
legislation: 1) the establishment of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission
S. Panitchpakdi and M.L. Clifford, “China and the WTO: Changing China, Changing World Trade“ (Wiley,
2002).
30
”2004 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance”, United States Trade Representative, 2004, pp. 3,
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/asset_upload_file281_6986.pdf.
29
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(“China Commission”) and 2) the statutory requirement that USTR report to Congress every year
on China’s compliance with its WTO obligations. No other country has similar provisions or
undergoes the level of scrutiny that China does.
A. The China Economic and Security Review Commission
The China Commission was created with the legislative mandate to monitor, investigate, and
submit to Congress an annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade
and economic relationship between the United States and China, and to provide
recommendations, where appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administrative action. Even
the title of the Commission with its joint focus on security and economics reflects the desire to
use PNTR and China’s accession to the WTO as leverage over security and geostrategic issues as
well as trade and economic matters. From its inception, the Commission was skeptical that
China would live up to its WTO commitments without constant and extraordinary vigilance from
the U.S. In its very first (2002) report issued less than one year after China’s accession, the
Commission recommended that: 1) the U.S. shore up its tool box by renewing the “Super 301”
law that identifies priority practices and priority countries for trade liberalization, 2) commence
WTO litigation over non-compliance with intellectual property rights, 3) engage in a more
intensive examination of WTO compliance, and 4) consider a national security-based case to
protect the U.S. steel industry.
The Commission also focused early attention on one of the major issues upsetting the balance of
concessions reached through China’s WTO accession—currency manipulation. Starting in the
early 2000’s and continuing for at least a decade thereafter, China kept the exchange rate of its
currency pegged at artificially low levels.31 Such currency manipulation made Chinese exports
to the world cheap but exports to China more expensive. The Commission noted that “China’s
currency manipulation acts as a subsidy for Chinese exports to the United States and a tax on
imports from the United States, and serves as an incentive for U.S. and foreign firms to move
production to China.”32 The Commission noted in 2005 that most economist believe that the
Chinese renminbi (RMB) is undervalued by 15 to 40 percent.33 China’s ability to manipulate its
currency through buying dollars and other foreign currency in China at a fixed rate contributed to
an excessive reliance on export-led growth that deepened distortions in the Chinese economy and
in its trading relationships.
By the mid-2000s, the China Commission’s reports were sounding the alarm about the “profound
differences between the open-market approach of the United States and the managed trade
principles and predatory practices observed by the Chinese government.”34 It began using a
“responsible stakeholder” index to assess whether China not only observes international norms
but works to strengthen them, finding that China was far from meeting that standard.35
31

Currency Conflict and Trade Policy, C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, June 2017.
32
2005 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, p. 4.
33
Ibid.
34
2006 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pp. 2, 2006.
35
Ibid.
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Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to the United States in 2015, the
Commission reports catalogued long and growing lists of grievances the United States has
against Chinese behavior, with currency manipulation, forced technology transfer, intellectual
property theft and excessive use of state subsidies often topping the list.36 The most recent
(2020) report concludes:
The CCP has launched determined and systematic efforts to hollow out global
governance institutions, suppress internal opposition, subjugate free peoples in
Hong Kong and around China’s periphery, dominate global economic resources,
and project military power. These efforts threaten vital interests of the United
States and the security and vitality of an increasing number of countries around
the globe. A clear understanding of the CCP’s adversarial national security and
economic ambitions is essential as U.S. and allied leaders develop the policies and
programs that will define the conditions of global freedom and shape our future.37
B. Annual USTR Reports on China’s WTO Compliance
To attempt to hold China to its WTO commitments, the United States used a multi-tracked
approach. One track involved a series of annual high-level bilateral talks between U.S. and
Chinese officials over three successive presidential administrations. These talks, initially called
the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT, started in 2004), the Strategic Economic
Dialogue, begun in 2006, and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) begun in 2009,
were intended to push China towards complying with and internalizing WTO rules and norms
and making other market-oriented changes. The second track involved WTO disputes to
challenge China’s compliance with its WTO obligations.
Both tracks for holding China to its WTO commitments have been catalogued over the past 20
years in the annual report that USTR is required to submit to Congress under the mandate
included in the legislation granting China PNTR status. The initial report, submitted in 2002,
reflects considerable optimism, noting the significant progress China made in implementing its
WTO commitments, including “reviewing more than 2,500 trade-related laws and regulations,

2015 report: “The grievances include the alleged theft by Chinese hackers of personal records of 22 million
people, including U.S. government employees, their families, and friends; state-sponsored cyber espionage against
U.S. companies to steal trade secrets and pass them to Chinese competitors; an unprecedented island-building
campaign in disputed waters of the South China Sea; and a series of new laws restricting access by foreign
companies to China’s market or demanding technology transfers in return for such access.”
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Security Review Commission, 2015. 2020 report: “Over the years, we have tracked the People’s Republic of China’s
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trade, and political obligations and has abandoned any concern for international opinion. Now the CCP envisions
itself atop a new hierarchical global order in which the world acquiesces to China’s worldview while supplying it
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37
“2020 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”, U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission, 2020.
36

11

repealing 830 of them, and amending 325 more.”38 The report also acknowledges the
considerable resources devoted to restructuring the various trade-related government ministries
and agencies and to the education and training of central and local government officials. It also
emphasized the commitments that the U.S. thought it had obtained regarding China’s transition
to a market economy: “For much of the past two decades, China had been gradually transitioning
toward a market economy from what in the late 1970’s was a strict command economy. In
acceding to the WTO, China was required by the United States and other WTO members to
agree to accelerate this process of market reform in order to comply with WTO requirements.”39
At the same time, the USTR Report raised early concerns over transparency, agriculture,
intellectual property rights and services. Just two years later, the 2004 report was even more
hopeful, quoting two trade associations view that “China is now substantially in compliance with
its WTO obligations—a marked improvement over last year.”40 The report also noted continued
areas of concern, including intellectual property rights, services, agriculture, industrial policies
and transparency. It added that the work of one of the many high-level dialogue groups –the
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT)-- was “highly constructive.”
Over the next number of years, these annual reports continued to report on bilateral dialogues
and WTO disputes, coming to the general conclusion that the intensive dialogues with China
generated positive outcomes on a number of contentious issues, while U.S. use of WTO dispute
settlement continued to generate favorable settlements and favorable WTO dispute settlement
decisions. The reports also continued to note on-going problem areas, including principally
intellectual property rights, industrial policies, trading rights, agriculture and services, including
distribution services. Increasingly the reports focused on the Chinese government’s
interventionist policies and practices and the large role of state-owned enterprises and other
national champions in China’s economy, which generated significant trade distortions giving rise
to trade frictions. The final Obama Administration report (2016) noted the major expansion in
U.S. goods and services exports to China but concluded that “despite these positive results, the
overall picture currently presented by China’s WTO membership remains complex.”41
Once the Trump Administration took office, however, the tone and underlying message changed
to one of failure. The view shifted, noting that “China largely remains a state-led economy
today, and the United States and other trading partners continue to encounter serious problems
with China’s trade regime. Meanwhile, China has used the imprimatur of WTO membership to
become a dominant player in international trade.” The report concluded: “Given these facts, it
seems clear that the United States erred in supporting China’s entry into the WTO on terms that
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have proven to be ineffective in securing China’s embrace of an open, market-oriented trade
regime.”42
IV. Failure to Use the WTO and China Accession Tools
Critical to support for China’s accession to the WTO were the tools built into China’s protocol of
accession and to the WTO rules themselves that many in the United States believed would both
protect our market from any downside risks and hold China to account for its commitments.
Key among the provisions designed to guard against harm to domestic economies around the
world were:
a) a selective safeguard provision lasting 12 years permitting countries to impose safeguards
(tariffs or quotas or other restraints) if they found that an increase in imports from China
alone was causing disruption to their domestic producers of comparable products,43
b) a right to apply non-market economy status when calculating anti-dumping duty rates to
imports from China, at least for a period of 15 years;44
c) a provision making it easier to apply countervailing duties to subsidized imports from
China if distorted market conditions in China present “special difficulties” to countries in
identifying and measuring subsidies;45 and
d) a provision lasting until December 31, 2008 limiting China’s textile and apparel exports
to amounts no greater than 7.5% (6% for wool products) above the amount entered in the
previous year if Chinese imports were impeding the orderly development of trade.46
1. Failures to Guard Domestic Markets
Among the most highly-touted of the provisions designed to guard against any potential harm
from China was a product-specific, selective safeguard provision that allowed WTO members to
impose safeguards (which normally can only be applied to imports from all sources) on imports
from China alone.47 The provision included a lower threshold for its application than traditional
safeguard measures which require a showing that imports have caused “serious injury” to a
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domestic industry producing comparable goods. Here, the standard permitted the application of
a China-only safeguard if Chinese imports were causing “market disruption.” In addition, a
clause in this new safeguard allowed a second country to justify its own imposition of a new
import restriction after a first country has implemented a China-safeguard on the basis of a “trade
deflection” threat alone, without having to carry out its own injury investigation. In the United
States, the common answer to Congressional concerns over a potential flood in imports from
China was the existence of this special safeguard and the ease in its application. The process to
implement it called upon the independent U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to
investigate all claims of market disruption and to report to the President any affirmative findings,
along with recommendations for actions to be taken to address the market disruption caused by
Chinese imports.48 The President was given the authority to accept, modify or reject the USITC’s
recommendations.49
In the 12 years that the China-specific safeguard provision was in effect and despite the
substantial increase in imports from China in a wide variety of products, the United States
imposed a China-specific safeguard only once.50 Part of the reluctance stemmed from decisions
made by the Bush administration not to impose safeguards despite a recommendation from the
USITC in five cases to do so.51 Failure to obtain a remedy despite proving market disruption may
have deterred potential complainants while concerns over WTO decisions striking down global
safeguards may have contributed to reticence in applying for safeguard relief. The one Chinaspecific safeguard that was imposed—on passenger vehicles and light truck tires—came eight
years after China’s accession to the WTO. It was also the first such safeguard challenged by
China, with the WTO’s Appellate Body upholding the United States’ determination to apply
safeguard measures to Chinese tires.52
Antidumping (AD) (selling goods in foreign markets for less than prices at home) and
countervailing duties (CVD) (offsets for government subsidies), however, were more commonly
deployed. From 2001 to 2020, WTO members have reported imposing 917 AD measures against
Chinese imports, approximately 30% of the total reported and 129 CVDs against Chinese
imports, approximately 46% of the total actions.53 For U.S. industries, the primary tool to
respond to increased imports from China, particularly in the 2000s, was anti-dumping duties,
with use of the “non-market economy methodology” permitted under Section 15(b) of China’s
protocol of accession to calculate the amount of those duties. As of September 2021, the United
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States has 142 AD orders in place on various goods from China, far more than the number of AD
measures against imports from any other country.54
Prior to 2007, the United States did not apply its CVD law to countries considered to be
nonmarket economies (NMEs) based in part on a conclusion by the Department of Commerce
(Commerce) that it could not determine where government action began or ended and therefore
could not specifically identify subsidies. In 1986, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States upheld this interpretation of the CVD statute
as reasonable. In 2006, Commerce changed its position, accepting a petition seeking a CVD on
imports of coated free-sheet paper from China. Commerce distinguished the current Chinese
economy from the Soviet-style economies at issue in Georgetown Steel and found that the
imported Chinese paper was subsidized. Numerous CVD cases followed, with 80 CVD orders
now in place against imports from China. But the rest of the world has been less willing to use
this tool, perhaps in part because it involves a direct challenge to the practices of the Chinese
government and the CCP compared to anti-dumping cases, which focus on the behavior of
individual companies. Even less clear is how willing countries are to use the “special
difficulties” tool provided in Paragraph 15 to overcome evidentiary hurdles in proving the
existence of a subsidy.
The textile-specific growth limit was similarly far less utilized than might have been expected,
given China’s dominant position as a supplier of textiles and clothing. In the United States, use
of such safeguards became bogged down in protracted legal battles over the application when
there was only a threat of market disruption.55
The world’s failure to use these tools—at least not early and often enough—was part of what
allowed China’s relatively unchecked rise in exports to the world.56 In the United States,
China’s rise was documented and labeled in a 2016 article titled “The China Shock: Learning
from Labor-Market Adjustment in Large Change in Trade,” by David Autor from MIT, David
Dorn (University of Zurich) and Gordon Hanson (UC-San Diego).57 The article noted that
China’s economic size, speed of growth and import penetration were all of an order of magnitude
different from previous waves of imports from Japan or Mexico or others. Imports from China
grew from 1.0 percent of US GDP in 2000 when China’s accession to the WTO was being
negotiated to 2.6 percent of GDP ten years later. The impact on communities where goods
competing directly with Chinese imports (such as furniture, toys, electronics, jewelry, shoes and
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clothing) were particularly profound, due in part to the lack of sufficient safety nets or trade
adjustment assistance and in part due to the unexpected immobility of labor.
While the U.S. imposed 199 anti-dumping and countervailing tariffs, primarily targeting raw and
semi-processed imports with some cases addressing finished goods like furniture and tires, the
wave of imports appeared to simply overwhelm many companies, leading to a conclusion that
the trade rules were not up the task of coping with the China shock and to the parallel
determination that it was a mistake for the United States to have allowed China to enter the WTO
on the terms that it did.58
2. Failure to Hold China to its Commitments on Transparency, Market Economy
Orientation, Rule of Law and More
A critical aspect of its advocacy for PNTR and China’s accession to the WTO was the assertion
that China’s conduct would be “monitored by more than 130 other WTO Members with a
common interest in seeing China's market opened.”59 “Unlike our bilateral agreements,” the
Clinton administration argued, “we will not be alone in our enforcement efforts if China fails to
live up to its commitments.”60
The most significant commitments for which compliance was sought involved those that
required China to open up its market under numerous specific commitments with respect to trade
in goods, agriculture and particular services commitments61; various commitments with respect
to the rule of law and transparency in the Chinese system,62 intellectual property rights
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requirements63, and numerous commitments intended to keep China on the path toward
becoming a fully market-oriented economy.64
For the first few years following China’s 2001 accession to the WTO, most WTO members took
a “wait and see” approach. For its part, the United States filed 23 different cases against specific
Chinese practices, with its first case filed in 2004, winning all that were completed, settling eight
of them through mutual agreement, with three still pending.65 The entire rest of the world
combined brought a comparable number or cases, with many countries appearing reluctant,
particularly early on, to challenge China for fear of retaliation or for lack of evidence from
China’s opaque system. However, each of these cases were somewhat narrowly focused on
individual measures or particular sectors. None spoke to the bigger, more systemic issues that
are at the heart of U.S. concerns with China or to China’s failure to fulfill its notification and
transparency requirements.
What might have been a better approach would have been a “big, bold, coalition-based case” that
would have represented an “opportunity to bring together enough of the trading interests in the
world to put sufficient pressure on China to make it clear that fundamental reform is required if
China is to remain a member in good standing in the WTO.”66 Just such a case was
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recommended by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, based in part on the
author’s testimony to the Commission.67
In my construction, the case could include claims to address China’s : 1) coercion of technology
transfers in light of China’s commitment that it would not condition investments on the transfer
of technology,68 2) restrictions on the right of foreign companies to license their technology (or
choose not to license it) under the conditions and terms that they would like in violation of China
national treatment and MFN commitments;69 3) direction of outbound investment to obtain
cutting-edge technology in service of China’s industrial policy, in violation of China’s
commitment to treat foreigners on a reciprocity basis;704) investment restrictions that preclude or
unreasonably delay market entry for foreign companies in violation of China’s commitment not
to condition investments on performance requirements or technology transfer,71 5) use of export
taxes to restrict or encourage certain exports over others, in violation of China’s commitment not
to charge such export taxes other than on a specific list of products,72 6) services restrictions that
are inconsistent with China’s GATS schedules, 7) restrictions on agriculture imports under nontransparent and non-science based sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 8) lack of transparency
and access to China’s laws, regulations and rules on timely basis, 9) failure to establish
independent judicial review of trade-related administrative decisions,73 and 10) failure to meet
the reasonable expectations of WTO members that China’s economy would become a marketoriented one.74
The last claim that I suggested is the one designed to get at the heart of the United States’
concern—that China’s U-turn away from market orientation to an ever more state-controlled
economy violates the spirit, if not always the letter, of the WTO.
3. China’s Turn Away from Market-Oriented Reforms
The overarching Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO declares that the organization was
designed as a world trading system “based upon open, market-oriented policies.” China, for
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example, expressly declared as part of its accession commitments that “that all state-owned and
state-invested enterprises would make purchases and sales based solely on commercial
considerations, e.g., price, quality, marketability and availability . . .”75
As a result, the United States and all other WTO members had legitimate expectations that China
would increasingly behave as a market economy—that it would achieve a discernable separation
between its government and its private sector, that private property rights and an understanding
of who controls and makes decisions in major enterprises would be clear, that subsidies would be
curtailed, that theft of IP rights would be punished and diminished in amount, that SOEs would
make purchases based on commercial considerations, that the Communist Party would not, by
fiat, occupy critical seats within major “private” enterprises and that standards and regulations
would be published for all to see.
But starting in the mid-2000s, China began what has now become a complete U-turn back to
becoming a state and Communist Party dominated economy.76 While parts of the economy
appear to have a thriving private sector, intervention by the government and the CCP has become
far more pervasive. Institutions were established giving Beijing tighter control over China’s large
and fast-growing SOEs (overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (SASAC)) and its banks (influenced via Central Huijin Investment). The
overlapping ways in which China’s economy is unique and state driven results in a phenomenon
dubbed “China, Inc.” that is hard to reach with WTO rules.77 Concerns about the direction of
China’s economy greatly intensified with the rise of Xi Jinping as China’s leader in 2012 and the
release of the Made in China 2025 plan designed to create Chinese self-sufficiency in a range of
critical technology sectors.
These concerns were succinctly summarized in the statement made by the then U.S. Ambassador
to the WTO, Dennis Shea, in a May 8, 2018 statement to the WTO General Council:
China . . . is consistently acting in ways that undermine the global system of open
and fair trade. Market access barriers too numerous to mention; forced technology
transfers; intellectual property theft on an unprecedented scale; indigenous
innovation policies and the Made in China 2025 program; discriminatory use of
technical standards; massive government subsidies that have led to chronic
overcapacity in key industrial sectors; and a highly restrictive foreign investment
regime.78
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It is this collective failure by China that underlies the trade friction between the United
States and China.
The concerns over the market-orientation of China’s economy are shared by many other
WTO members. When the G-20 trade ministers met in September 2020, for example,
much of the discussion centered on strengthening the WTO, beginning with a
reaffirmation of commitment to the objectives and principles in the Marrakesh
Agreement. But when it came to affirming that “market-oriented policies” is a principle
of the WTO, China objected. It is this fundamental split that has led some leading trade
scholars to conclude that “the world is now presented with two conflicting economic
systems: (1) a Western-led, market-driven, model based on the rule of law and (2) an
authoritarian state-driven model championed by China,” and that the solution is to
“establish a ‘compact’ among like-minded developed market economies to agree to new
common approaches to counter unfair non-market practices; address critical twenty-first
century economic issues such as the digital economy, climate change and the
environment, and labor; and improve economic ties in industries that are key to
innovation, economic growth, and national security.”79
IV. Conclusion—Implications of the Failures and Where We Go from Here
The failure of China’s accession to the WTO to meet the very large and arguably unrealistic
expectations across the economic, trade, geopolitical and national security arenas likely portends
a permanent shift in the U.S. approach to China. The initial vision of the Clinton administration
was that the WTO could serve as the backstop to the Sino-American trade relationship--a facially
neutral arbiter that could help enforce the liberal trade rules that Washington preferred. It was
created and nurtured in an era where U.S. strategists saw trade with China and the rest of the
world as a largely unambiguous good, capable of advancing both their strategic and domestic
political ambitions. For the reasons noted above, that view has fundamentally changed.
This new reality means, at a minimum, that the U.S. will need to rely on a far wider array of
tools than simply the WTO and its dispute settlement process to address its concerns.80 It also
means that reforms at the WTO will need to be deeper and more directed at addressing the
fundamental schism between market-oriented economies and state-controlled ones.
A fulsome explanation of what the U.S. should do outside of the WTO is beyond the scope of
this paper, but it should include at a minimum renewed attention to the work of the U.S.-EUJapan trilateral cooperative process aimed at developing new rules on subsidies and tech transfer
and greater reliance on the deep transatlantic alliance with Europe, the recently reinvigorated
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and the United States) and alternative
forums such as the G-7, the G-20, and the OECD to develop a more coordinated approach to the
China trade challenge. Also included should be exploration of the U.S. rejoining the TransW. Reinsch and J. Caporal,” Toward a New Global Trade Framework”, Center for Strategic and International
Studies Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership, 2021.
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Pacific Partnership (now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CP-TPP)) in order to ensure that the United States has a seat at the table while the
trade architecture in Asia is put in place and reassure our trading partners that the United States
remains committed to the region. The U.S. must also follow through on the Biden’
administration’s Build Back Better plan to shore up American competitiveness and supply chain
resilience, particularly in key sectors and technologies. It must also rely on both bilateral and
plurilateral dialogues to address the many geostrategic and national security concerns raised by a
more assertive China.
At the WTO, the United States needs to lead the effort to fix the WTO. The WTO is in desperate
need of reform and revitalization, but that will not happen absent U.S. leadership and
commitment. Reforming the WTO would also allow it to be a more effective tool among many
that the United States will need to address its China concerns. The reforms need to focus on the
structural flaws at the WTO, including the imbalance between its dispute settlement, negotiating
and executive functions and the unsustainable bifurcation between developed and developing
countries that China has exploited despite its immense economic heft and the power of its trade.
The reforms will also need to focus on the gaps in the substantive rules, starting with new
disciplines on the transfer of technology, the classification of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs),
and the rules on subsidies. Additional efforts should also be made to bring into the WTO the ecommerce and digital trade provisions from the USMCA or the CP-TPP.
While it is clear that the WTO should not and cannot serve as the only forum for working out
America’s concerns with the rise of China, the WTO cannot and should not be abandoned. It
should be fixed in its own right as the premiere forum for bringing together the world’s trading
nations to negotiate and enforce rules, to exchange information, to disseminate best practices and
to provide transparency with respect to trading practices and measures. In so doing, the WTO
can begin what will be a long process of developing rules or norms to address concerns over
China’s industrial policies, its non-tariff barriers, and its abuse of intellectual property and
technology rights.
In the end, the United States expected too much of the WTO and the WTO delivered too little.
Righting that balance will require a stronger, more responsive and more inclusive WTO and a
more robust tool kit to address the national security and geostrategic concerns that the WTO was
never going to be in a position to resolve.
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